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Since the 1950s and 60s, Japanese companies have been shifting their manufacturing oper-
ations overseas. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on 
the production base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was need-
ed to stabilize the situation in the FDI-host countries and consolidate the internationalization of 
production networks. Japanese bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) were utilized for this pur-
pose. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that FTAs have been 
developed as a tool for securing fi rms’ commercial interests. They have been a part of a broader 
policy of supporting rapid industrialization and economic growth since the Yoshida Doctrine. 
Japan has signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is cur-
rently participating in three coexisting frameworks with regional economic integration agendas, 
which include fostering of a region-wide FTA. This study focuses on the use of FTAs by Japanese 
corporations – FTAs’ main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial objectives do dif-
ferent types of existing FTAs (bilateral, semi-regional) fulfi ll for Japanese corporations, mainly 
in the electronics and machinery sectors, and how successful are they in performing this role? 
What additional value-added benefi ts could the planned region-wide FTA bring? In other words, 
do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or do the bilateral agreements and the semi-
regional one provide a suffi cient response to the fi rms’ foreign commercial goals? I discuss the 
inter-constitutive nature of the value-added benefits of different levels of Japan’ s FTAs. Both 
trade theory and econometric studies of FTAs point to the conclusion that bilateral FTAs are a 
second-best option to semi-regional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing than 
is regional or global multilateral liberalization. Despite that, this study fi nds that there is little 
support among Japanese MNCs in the electronics and machinery sector for a region-wide FTA. 
Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series of interviews with Japanese MNCs, gov-
ernmental offi cials and analysts conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010.
1. Introduction
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) have been developed as a tool for securing fi rms’ commercial interests. Japan has 
signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is currently par-
ticipating in three coexisting frameworks with a regional economic integration agenda, which in-
cludes the fostering of a region-wide FTA. The study focuses on the use of free trade agreements 
by Japanese corporations – FTAs’ main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial 
objectives do different types of existing FTAs fulfi ll for the Japanese corporations, and how suc-
cessful are they in performing this role? What additional value-added benefi ts could the planned 
region-wide FTA bring? In other words, do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or 
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do the bilateral agreements and the semi-regional one provide a suffi cient enough response to 
the fi rms’ foreign commercial goals? Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series of 
interviews with Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), government offi cials and analysts, 
conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010. It is a part of a broader research proj-
ect to analyze the complex interaction between various levels of factors infl uencing the prefer-
ences of Japan’ s main actors regarding a region-wide FTA. The research argues that these main 
actors’ preferences are central to the process of FTA policy formation. Based on Aggarwal’ s 
framework 1 it appears that political and diplomatic efforts are required for a country to sign a 
new FTA or to harmonize the existing ones. There have to be enough aggregated, expected gains 
from the outcome to provide suffi cient incentive for signing of a treaty. 2 Therefore, the research 
focuses on the preferences, understood as the optimal, desired outcome, of the main groups of 
actors. The understanding behind this methodology is that in order for an FTA to be signed, pro-
liberalization preferences within the country must exceed anti-liberalization ones. In this study, 
I focus on one group of actors – the private sector, namely the Japanese MNCs, from the elec-
tronics and machinery industries, primarily. This limitation results from the fact that preferences 
regarding FTAs differ greatly between sectors, making it impossible to defi ne interests of the pri-
vate sector as a whole. The two selected sectors had vested interests in the formation of an FTA 
network in East Asia, given the location of their production facilities and the importance of trade 
in parts and components for their operations.
The present study fi ts within the ‘multilateralizing bilateralism’ debate, 3 which focuses on 
the issue of harmonization and consolidation of FTAs; this union would mean a progression from 
bilateral agreements to a semi-regional one (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship) and, perhaps, a multilateral, region-wide treaty in the future. To this aim, I establish what 
the companies’ preferences for different types of FTAs were in order to explain Japan’ s overlap-
ping trade treaties with ASEAN members. Then, I look at current preferences for a region-wide 
agreement in Asia to assess how much support there is for such a treaty, and to understand why, 
despite Japan’ s participation in several regional economic integration schemes, there is little 
progress in this regard. As Japan’ s MNCs were often referred to as the main supporters of Ja-
pan’ s FTAs, 4 their preferences are an important factor that may tip the scale of domestic support.
 Trade theory states that the more countries participate in an FTA, the more economic gains 
it is likely to bring. The gravity model has been used to research the desirability of different vari-
ants of an East Asian FTA, such as an ASEAN+3 FTA, an ASEAN+6 FTA and so on. A wider re-
gional agreement would potentially bring higher economic gains for all members. An ASEAN+3 
FTA would have a bigger trade creation effect than a similar agreement between Japan, China 
and South Korea, though it would, in turn, be less profi table than ASEAN+6. 5 Both trade theory 
and econometric studies of FTAs conclude that bilateral FTAs are a second-best option to semi-
regional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing than regional or global multilater-
al liberalization. The size of benefi ts from trade treaties for a given economy depends on several 
factors, out of which the scope and depth of the agreement is not the least important. Even if we 
assume modest benefi ts from trade liberalization, according to this reasoning, the private sector 
should profi t from establishing a region-wide FTA in East Asia. Still, this study fi nds that there is 
little support among companies in the electronics and machinery sectors for a region-wide FTA. 
This lack is caused by the type of production organization the Japanese multinational companies 
use, and by the market-led economic integration in East Asia. This article presents the added ben-
efi ts of Japan’ s bilateral FTAs, and those of the agreement with ASEAN, from the private sec-
tor’ s perspective. It explains why the companies are more interested in deepening liberalization 
under the bilateral treaties than in increasing efforts for a region-wide agreement. Parts two, three 
and four of this article present the impact of tariff liberalization under FTAs in East Asia on Japa-
nese MNCs. Part fi ve analyzes the current interest in a region-wide agreement.
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2. Emergence of Vertically Integrated Production Networks and the Impact of the ASEAN 
FTA (AFTA)
East Asia has been an increasingly important market for Japanese companies over the last 
several decades. As Japan is a developed economy with an ageing society, the companies would 
struggle to survive on the local market alone. 6 Japanese companies started investing in moving 
their production networks to other countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The Plaza Accord of Sep-
tember 1985 reinforced this process. It was the turning point for Japan, commencing the shift 
from a multilateral approach to liberalization, based on the WTO, to a multi-track one in the late 
1990s, whereby the country pursued FTAs parallel to the WTO negotiations. After the Plaza Ac-
cord and the realignment of Yen to the US dollar, the dollar depreciated against the appreciating 
Yen, making Japanese products expensive on the US market. Continuing to manufacture all prod-
ucts within Japan was no longer profitable for many, especially labor-intensive industries. Al-
though Japanese companies, even today, prefer to manufacture core parts and components within 
Japan, they have continued to move production bases outside the country. This shift was first 
directed to the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) – Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan – and then to the ASEAN countries. A large number of the investing companies were 
in the electronic and electrical appliance sectors as well as machinery and automobile sectors. 
Japan’ s core foreign economic goal, at the time, was to consolidate the situation after the Plaza 
Accord. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on the pro-
duction base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was needed to 
stabilize the situation in the foreign direct investment (FDI)-host countries, and to consolidate the 
internationalization of the production networks. Such agreement would aim to preserve the status 
quo.
The years 1999 and 2000 brought a change in Japan’ s policy towards trade agreements, as 
many countries in the region were starting to think about bilateral FTAs, and China proposed a 
treaty to ASEAN in 2000. China’ s FTA proposal to ASEAN was the main trigger for Japan’ s 
shift to bilateral FTAs, but because so much of the groundwork had already been done, Japan 
was able to change its policy quickly. 7 The Japanese production networks established in the 
ASEAN countries were then extended to China in the late 1990s. The core of this network shifted 
to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in the following years. This spread further infl uenced com-
panies’ interest in the region. After securing the country’ s fi rst FTA with Singapore, the Japanese 
government had a clear idea of what could help MNCs’ operations – an agreement with ASEAN 
countries. As Japan’ s production network is located in East Asia, an FTA with ASEAN members 
would help business operations there. Thailand’ s average MFN tariff was 8.2 percent, which 
made importing parts and components expensive for Japanese companies. 8 However, instead of 
negotiating an FTA with ASEAN as China and Korea did, Japan started by negotiating bilateral 
agreements with several ASEAN members fi rst. This was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) 
preference, as it wanted to use bilateral agreements as a tool for strengthening bilateral relations. 9 
Additionally, this strategy allowed Japan to avoid the situation where ASEAN member countries 
could block its demands during FTA negotiations; it had more bargaining power in bilateral ne-
gotiations.
When Japanese companies shifted their production to East Asia, they established vertically 
integrated production networks. This phenomenon, also known as internationalization of produc-
tion, production fragmentation or production sharing, occurs when companies move their labor-
intensive stages of production abroad to less developed countries while the capital-intensive stag-
es are carried through at home, where parts or intermediate goods are further processed. Hence, 
manufacturing stages occur in the most cost-effi cient locations. In East Asia, the intra-industry 
trade in parts and components, related to production fragmentation, has not only increased the 
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overall volume of intraregional trade, but it has also strengthened regional interdependence. 
Production sharing spread in the region due to ‘the region’ s wide range of development levels, 
strong intraregional links, and capacity for organizational and technological change.’ 10
Figure 1
Source:  AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ s 
translation)
Figure 1 presents the situation in East Asia before 1992 from the perspective of Japan’ s MNCs 
with a vertically integrated production network. In the 1990s, a Japanese company operating a 
parts production facility (D) and an assembly site in ASEAN had to pay tariffs at universal rates 
(most favorite nation tariff – MFN), while exporting parts and components from Japan to the re-
spective factories. Similarly, MFN tariffs had to be paid when exporting a part from one ASEAN 
member country to another (D), when obtaining additional parts originating in ASEAN (I), and 
when exporting the fi nished good to the ASEAN market (G). In this fi gure, the dotted line repre-
sents parts, components and intermediates. The solid line represents trade in fi nished goods.
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Figure 2
Source:  AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ s 
translation)
Figure 2 represents how the 1992 signing of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) affected 
the production networks of Japanese MNCs. AFTA allowed the assembling site to import parts 
and components from other ASEAN member states (I) without paying tariffs. As the agreement 
set a 40 percent minimum local content rule of origin (RoO) for the good to be traded under pref-
erential tariffs, any product exceeding this amount was still exported from a parts production fa-
cility (D) and assembly site under the MFN tariff.
3. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
Japanese companies started supporting FTAs due to the increasing competition in the Asian 
markets. Bilateral FTAs offer Japanese multinational fi rms many benefi ts. For instance, they pro-
tect companies from the competition of other countries entering the same market. Companies are 
able to import parts and machinery from Japan to the FTA partner country, where their production 
facilities are located, under reduced tariffs. This deal is mainly the case for ASEAN members, 
which provide Japanese MNCs with resources and intermediates. Manger argues that “Japanese 
fi rms with vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs, 
in particular when their profi ts are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries.” 11 Vertically 
integrated multinationals have production facilities, as well as parts and components suppliers, 
in different countries. The removal of tariffs under an FTA facilitates the movement of parts and 
materials between production and assembling facilities, and also the sale of the fi nal good. Ad-
ditionally, companies lower their costs and increase returns on investments. Therefore, Japan’ s 
subsidiaries in host countries made their support for bilateral free trade agreements known to the 
local and Japanese governments. Blechinger and Legewie state that “regional cooperation was 
mainly promoted by multinational fi rms interested in building up a horizontal division of labour 
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with regional production and sales networks to connect their various overseas activities on a 
more effi cient regional scale.” 12 The proliferation of bilateral or preferential trade agreements, 
worldwide and in the region, is one of the reasons behind Japan’ s pursuit of FTAs, as explained 
by Baldwin’ s domino theory and the competitive liberalization theory (Baldwin 2004; Bergsten 
1994; Dobson 2001). It implies that the proliferation of FTAs in a region causes other countries 
to sign further trade agreements to offset the trade diversion effects of those already in existence. 
In other words: FTAs beget further FTAs. In particular, the agreements signed by the US, China, 
and recently, Korea, are of great concern to Japan’ s private sector. Currently, the FTA between 
the EU and South Korea worries Japan. The EU tariffs are considerably high, especially on elec-
trical appliances, with a maximum tariff of 14 percent. 13 On the other hand, the EU is also negoti-
ating an agreement with ASEAN and India. An EU-ASEAN FTA would be good for Japan as the 
country’ s production base is located mainly in the ASEAN region.
The private sector also profi ts from the type of FTAs Japan is signing. Japan names its FTAs 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), given the inclusion of some elements and various 
provisions aiming at the harmonization of regulations and economic cooperation. They are, so 
called, ‘broad band’ agreements. ‘Broad band FTA’ is a generic name for FTAs including com-
prehensive commitments to liberalization of non-tariff barriers to trade. They can include various 
provisions ranging from eliminating technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and enforcing rules on 
intellectual property rights (IPR) and government procurement, to overseeing competition policy 
and investment measures. They are also concerned with issues such as labor and environment, as 
well as various forms of further cooperation. Broad band FTAs include ‘deep’ integration mea-
sures, meaning that they remove not only border barriers, but also beyond-the-border measures. 14 
They can include provisions on: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, in-
vestment, competition policy, cooperation in environmental issues, IT, or labor standards. This 
type of FTA is directly aimed at certain companies’ interests, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector. For them, tariff reduction is still important, despite the falling of MFN rates, but a strong 
focus is also placed on how FTAs can further improve operations of production networks and 
secure Japanese investments in East Asian markets. Therefore, the country’ s FTAs focus on ele-
ments that help to achieve that, such as: trade facilitation, investment protection or facilitation, 
economic cooperation, and international financial policy cooperation. Improving the business 
environment in partner countries and infl uencing the East Asian states to introduce necessary re-
forms is an important motivation for Japan. 15
In many cases, FTAs function as a defensive tool; they are signed as a result of domestic 
pressure from the private sector, namely by companies in a disadvantaged position due to trade 
treaties signed by other countries. For example, following the implementation of NAFTA and the 
signature of the Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement, Japanese manufacturers found themselves 
in a disadvantaged position on the Mexican market. They had an incentive to lobby the govern-
ment to negotiate a similar treaty that would provide them with equal market access. Whereas 
their American and European counterparts enjoyed preferential access, Japanese MNCs, among 
the OECD members, were the only ones to pay high customs duties on automobiles in Mexico. 
At the time, Mexico’ s tariffs averaged 16 percent and tariffs on automobiles were 50 percent. 16 
NAFTA members exported automobiles to Mexico duty-free, while the EU countries paid 10 per-
cent tariffs. The Japanese automobile sector demonstrated its losses and asked the government to 
sign an FTA. It was not the only sector that lobbied for the establishment of this treaty. Mexico 
grants a preferential status in government procurement to its FTA partners. This setup prevented 
Japanese companies in the electronics sector, among other companies, from selling power gener-
ation equipment and hospital-use medical equipment to that country. 17 For example, X-ray medi-
cal equipment exported to Mexico was subjected to a 40 percent customs duty. 18
As explained earlier, the companies’ preferences regarding bilateral FTAs differ from sector 
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to sector. They can also differ substantially within the sectors, depending on how much a given 
company has invested and operates in the prospective FTA partner country. The ‘big three’ of 
Japanese auto companies, Toyota, Nissan and Honda, have already had operations in Mexico and 
enjoyed a tariff-free quota on imports. This tariff-free quota was available under a Mexican gov-
ernment’ s provision, whereby it “allowed for duty-free imports of fi nished vehicles, equivalent to 
10 percent of their local production, for foreign assemblers in Mexico.” 19 Those companies had 
an advantage over other Japanese automakers such as Suzuki or Mazda, which had to pay high 
taxes in order to penetrate the Mexican market and had no export quota. Hence, the ‘big three’ 
companies did not strongly support the Japan-Mexico FTA. The preferences of automobile com-
panies differed also in the case of the Japan-Malaysia FTA. Malaysia implemented high tariffs 
on cars and supported its domestic auto industry with subsidies and a national car policy. One of 
the two dominant Malaysian producers, Perodua, cooperated with Japanese automobile company 
Daihatsu Motor in a joint venture. 20 Daihatsu provided a substantial amount of technology and 
sent staff members to cooperate with the national brand. The company enjoyed high tariff pro-
tection that gave it an advantage on the Malaysian market. Therefore, it was against the Japan-
Malaysia FTA. A similar situation is taking place in India, where Suzuki produces automobiles 
for the local market through a Maruti Suzuki joint venture; here, Suzuki holds over 50 percent of 
stakes. As India implements high tariffs on cars, an India-Japan FTA would have a negative im-
pact on Suzuki’ s operations in the country.
 According to Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) statistics, out of all its bilateral 
FTAs, Japan uses the agreement with Thailand and Malaysia the most. 21 These countries are hubs 
for Japanese companies’ production in the region. Japan-Thailand and Japan-Malaysia Economic 
Partnership Agreements are followed by AFTA, 22 which is heavily utilized by Japanese MNCs 
for obtaining parts and components as well as selling fi nished goods to other ASEAN countries. 
Given the location of those companies’ production bases, FTAs between third parties often play 
a crucial role. This trend is particularly true in case of the electronics sector, in which most prod-
ucts are produced in East Asia, and hence, there are few fi nished goods to export from Japan. A 
great majority of the industry’ s fi nished goods, still manufactured in Japan, are on the Informa-
tion Technology Agreement (ITA) product list and are therefore exported duty-free. Thanks to 
ITA, companies import parts and components to their production sites in ASEAN states without 
customs duties. With no products to export and no customs duties to pay, the impact of an FTA 
is limited at best. Industries such as automobile, chemical and apparel still manufacture a part of 
their goods in Japan and so use Japan’ s FTAs. 23 A substantial number of companies in the elec-
tronics industry use AFTA to obtain parts and sell goods to ASEAN. For example, one of Japan’ s 
leading multinational companies in the electronics sector produces many of its goods in Thai-
land, to which it imports parts from other ASEAN countries under AFTA. 24 A few parts are also 
imported from Japan under the Japan-Thailand FTA (JTEPA), or from China and Korea under 
their respective FTAs with ASEAN. Finished goods are exported from Thailand to other ASEAN 
countries under AFTA and to third parties under, for example, the ASEAN-India FTA. Hence, 
Japanese companies use many FTAs of which Japan is not necessarily a member. Japanese au-
tomobile companies manufacture their products for Indian and Australian markets in Thailand. 
Both of these countries are large and important markets. The increase in the volume of automo-
bile exports from Thailand to Australia is strongly related to sales of cars made in Thailand by 
Japanese companies, such as Honda and Toyota. 25 A substantial amount of Suzuki’ s production 
is located in India through Maruti Suzuki. Thailand-Australia and Thailand-India FTAs are heav-
ily utilized by Japanese companies both in the electronics and automobile sectors. For example, 
representatives of Japan’ s private sector located in Thailand communicated closely with the Thai 
government, expressing their preferences regarding a free trade agreement with India. 26 As a 
result, 82 products, selected for the Early Harvest Program between Thailand and India (84 Har-
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monized Commodity Description and Coding System subheading categories), included parts for 
televisions, air conditioners and gear boxes – goods produced by Japanese companies in Thai-
land.
Figure 3
Source:  AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010).  (Author’ s 
translation)
Figure 3 shows the impact of tariff reductions only. Of course, Japan’ s bilateral FTAs are com-
prehensive agreements and the broad band FTA provisions within them are the main source of 
companies’ benefi ts, as was explained earlier. After signing bilateral agreements with ASEAN 
members, companies with vertically integrated production networks were able to import parts 
and intermediates from Japan to the parts factory (D) and the assembling site. However, they 
still needed to pay the MFN tariff when trading goods exceeding 40 percent local content within 
ASEAN.
4. ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)
After the signing of bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, what was the incentive for 
signing a semi-regional FTA with ASEAN as a group? And why were the bilateral agreements 
kept after AJCEP was reached? For the countries with which Japan already had a bilateral FTA, 
companies could choose under which agreement they wanted to trade. An exporter wishing to 
sell products to Thailand may compare the tariff rates for that good between the MFN tariff, the 
Japan-Thailand FTA, and the Japan-ASEAN FTA and simply choose the lowest one. Keeping 
the bilateral FTAs while implementing AJCEP was discussed with members of the private sec-
tor, who stated that they were used to utilizing particular provisions of the existing treaties. As 
companies are used to utilizing particular parts of bilateral treaties and their areas of operation 
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are quite narrow, the coexistence of the two types of agreements, from their perspective, does not 
pose a problem. 27
The objectives of bilateral and semi-regional agreements are somewhat different. Bilateral 
FTAs with ASEAN members often offer deeper tariff concessions than AJCEP, as well as some 
WTO-plus provisions. AJCEP is an agreement on goods only. Additionally, the tariff reduction 
schedules in AJCEP were incorporated from bilateral agreements with particular countries. This 
means that AJCEP does not have a common implementation schedule. As the bilateral agree-
ments were signed earlier, their implementation schedules started earlier and hence, the current 
tariffs are often lower, even if the liberalization schedule is the same for both agreements. If 
under JTEPA Thailand was allowed to liberalize a tariff for a product over 10 years, under the 
semi-regional agreement (AJCEPA), the phase-in schedules were, in most cases, set for the same 
amount of time. 28 However, in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, bilateral agreements went 
into effect in 2006, two years before AJCEPA. For Thailand, this gap is one year. On the other 
hand, for some goods, such as textiles, AJCEP is more profi table for Japanese companies as it in-
troduces immediate tariff elimination. The treaty also covers all ASEAN countries, including the 
least developed ones (Myanmar, Brunei and Cambodia). In a way, it could be conceptualized as 
the lowest common denominator in terms of trade liberalization between Japan and the Associa-
tion’ s members. It was politically important to have an agreement with all ASEAN countries. 29 
An agreement with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore (the ASEAN 5) 
and perhaps Vietnam was important for companies in the discussed sectors. The other four coun-
tries were attractive FTA partners from the perspective of textile and apparel industries. 30
Rules of origin (RoO) determine the origin of a given good, preventing third parties (non-
members) from using preferential tariffs. Their existence has a big impact on Japanese MNCs’ 
operations. As one of the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, RoO can limit the company’ s abil-
ity to use FTAs. AJCEP simplifi es the rules of origin by allowing companies to choose between 
VC and CTC rules. The VC rule of origin is based on a minimum local value-added content. The 
change in tariff classifi cation (CTC) rule of origin requires a change of heading level under the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), an international classification 
system under World Customs Organization (WCO) that describes goods and products. This type 
of provision, known as co-equal RoO, is now becoming a standard in the region. According to 
recent studies, it is the preferred solution for most Japanese companies. 31 First, Japan introduced 
such criteria for several product lines in ASEAN-Japan and bilateral FTAs, with those between 
Japan and Malaysia 32 or Thailand as examples. Then, ASEAN-Korea 33 and ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand FTAs, and even ASEAN itself, adopted that system. 34 AANZFTA uses co-equal 
approach on approximately 83 percent of all tariff sub-headings. 35 Extending co-equal rule could 
offset the negative aspects of overlapping agreements and allow for the harmonization of RoOs 
in the future. When all FTA members use the same type of rules of origin, diagonal cumulation is 
possible as it was done in the case of the Pan-European Cumulation System from 1997 (PECS). 
It allows for cumulation of added value in all member countries when determining the origin of a 
given product. Materials originating in one member country are treated as local in other countries 
within the FTA. The product does not change origin once it enters the FTA territory. Diagonal cu-
mulation creates a sort of ‘RoO custom union’ with common external rules of origin.
Cumulation of rules of origin is one of the most important features of AJCEP. Co-equal rule 
in the ASEAN-Japan FTA enabled companies to use parts and components of any origin. 36 They 
can now produce in Thailand using Korean parts under the ASEAN-Thailand FTA and export the 
fi nished product to other ASEAN countries duty-free under the AJCEPA, even if Korean parts 
constitute more than 40 percent of the fi nished good. A multinational company wishing to export 
parts and components to its subsidy or production site in ASEAN would use a bilateral agree-
ment. AJCEPA, with the CTC rule, is more profi table for exporting the fi nished good to another 
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ASEAN member. This change is signifi cant for many industries, especially those where the pric-
es of products are similar and even small changes in tariff rates can decide who has the compara-
tive advantage. For most sectors, the Japan-ASEAN FTA had little meaning in terms of tariff lib-
eralization. Its value added lay in the possibility of cumulation. However, this potential for profi t 
is utilized only by a few Japanese MNCs, who have vertically integrated production networks in 
ASEAN. Therefore, the private sector, as a whole, did not strongly support AJCEP. 37
The electronics sector provides a good example of how an FTA with ASEAN is signifi cant. 
The production bases of electronics companies are located mostly outside Japan and they of-
ten manufacture only a handful of products at home. Japanese TV manufacturers, for example, 
have production sites in ASEAN member countries. 38 A company producing an LCD TV within 
ASEAN imports the LCD fl at panel from, for example, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or China, where 
they are produced. The panel in itself constitutes almost 60 or 70 percent of the fi nal product’ s 
price, and in order to comply with AFTA, to be sold within ASEAN duty-free, the product should 
have a minimum of 40 percent local content. Japanese companies, though, import panels from 
outside ASEAN; this fact, given the value of the LCD panels, clearly means that the 40 percent 
local content requirement was not met. Having only the bilateral agreements with ASEAN mem-
bers, Japanese companies would have benefi ted from importing the panel to ASEAN from Japan, 
Korea or China – which would have been duty-free under the ITA – and then sold the fi nished 
good locally under the bilateral FTAs. However, due to AFTA regulations dealing with export to 
other ASEAN countries, the MFN tariff had to be paid. At the same time, Korea signed an FTA 
with ASEAN, enabling it to export Korean LCD panels from one ASEAN country to another. 
Therefore, LCD panels produced in Japan lost their competitive advantage. So, in order to retain 
competitive advantage of panels and other high value added parts and components, Japanese 
companies from this sector strongly urged the government to sign a similar agreement.
Figure 4
Source:  AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ s 
translation)
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Figure 4 presents the impact of cumulation of RoO under the AJCEP. The ASEAN-Japan treaty 
liberalized trade in goods only, and there were no additional broad band provisions.  A company 
with a vertically integrated production network was now able to trade both intermediates and the 
fi nished good within ASEAN under no tariffs, even if the fi nished product fell below 40 percent 
local ASEAN content.
There are additional reasons for implementing co-equal rule in AJCEP. For industries using 
a specifi c production process and technology, such as the chemical industry, CTC rule of origin 
is often impossible to apply. On the other hand, rules of origin based solely on the VC can be 
restrictive and diffi cult to comply with. An automobile is comprised of around 30 thousand parts 
and components which makes applying the local content rule of origin diffi cult. Big companies 
purchase parts from several to several hundreds of vendors and local suppliers, who often have 
little knowledge of rules of origin requirements. The company, on the other hand, requires a cer-
tifi cate to prove the origin of a given good. If the supplier refuses to issue a certifi cate, the buyers 
cannot buy the parts.
In 2010, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) consolidated the Common Ef-
fective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) and ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) provisions, which 
were in force since 1992. The change, made after the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership was enacted, greatly diminished the benefi ts of the AJCEP agreement. Many Japa-
nese MNCs, in the discussed sectors, no longer needed AJCEP, as they could profi t from cumu-
lation under AFTA. Companies tend to use bilateral FTAs, as they offer deeper concessions for 
exporting parts, components or fi nished goods from Japan to facilities in ASEAN countries. In 
order to further export products to other ASEAN members, they can use either AJCEP or ATIGA. 
Using ATIGA has an advantage for many companies.  Japanese companies have been using the 
agreement since it went into effect, and hence, they are familiar with its provisions and function-
ing. The number of companies using AJCEP is very low. 39 This statement has been confi rmed by 
the interviewed companies.
5. Region-wide Agreement and the Importance of Trade Facilitation
In December 2004, Japan’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published a document en-
titled “Basic Policy Towards Further Promotion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).”
This document presents Japan’ s strategy towards FTAs in East Asia: “EPAs contribute to the cre-
ation of international environment further benefi cial to our country from the politically and dip-
lomatically strategic points through, among others, fostering the establishment of an East Asian 
community.” 40 A region-wide FTA would be the fi rst and crucial step on this path. Japan stated 
its support for such initiative on many occasions and is currently participating in three coexisting 
frameworks with regional economic integration agendas, which include fostering of a regional 
FTA: ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN plus China, Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+6); and the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Co-
operation (APEC). How do the FTAs’ main clients – multinational corporations – see the pros-
pects of a region-wide FTA? Is there a need for a further trade treaty?
The signing of the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the changing of rules under AFTA allowed 
companies to profi t from cumulation between their sales and manufacturing facilities in mem-
ber countries and headquarters in Japan. Additionally, the expanding FTA network offers them 
indirect access to other foreign markets. Under the current circumstances, the companies have 
worked out a way to maximize their profi ts and avoid paying tariffs where possible. They have 
found the best localization for their production and assembly facilities. As shown in Figure 4, the 
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cumulation of RoO under AJCEP, together with comprehensive, broad band provisions under bi-
lateral FTAs, signifi cantly dulled the issue of tariffs in East Asia. Of course, there are other mat-
ters of importance for Japanese industry, such as access to the Indian or Australian markets and 
inclusion of Taiwan in the FTA network. There are also other types of governmental incentive 
schemes that further complicate the spaghetti bowl effect in East Asia, and also factor into com-
panies’ choices of production location. For example, Thailand has introduced the eco-car incen-
tives scheme for companies manufacturing green cars within the country. Under this program, the 
Thailand Board of Investment offers corporate income tax exemption for 8 years and duty-free 
importation of machinery for qualifying projects. In addition, the Finance Ministry offers fur-
ther tax incentives. In order to qualify for the eco-car incentive scheme an auto-maker company 
needs to meet certain requirements: meet environmental standards, fulfi ll the minimum invest-
ment value, and be able to produce over 100,000 automotive units per year after fi ve years from 
the beginning of the project. Furthermore, the company should manufacture certain key parts 
and assemble the car in Thailand. Nissan Motor Corporation was the fi rst company to produce an 
eco-car under this scheme. Mitsubishi Motor, Toyota Motor and Honda Motor are among other 
companies interested in producing the eco-car in Thailand. The existence of such government 
incentive schemes, on top of preferential provisions under various FTAs, further complicates the 
situation in East Asia. The companies try to choose the best possible location for their production 
and assembly facilities amid a complex network of tariff reductions and various other regula-
tions.
Keeping all of the above in mind, for the Japanese companies, the issues of investment lib-
eralization and trade facilitation are becoming increasingly signifi cant aspects of regional eco-
nomic integration. Deep liberalization provisions have the potential to improve Japanese MNCs’ 
operations in East Asia. Japan would like to see further integration with ASEAN, but to the 
extent that it would exceed tariff reduction and include provisions on trade facilitation. 41 Within 
existing FTAs, Japan usually sets up a bilateral committee aiming to facilitate development of 
the business environment and improvement of investment regulations. Its goal is to harmonize 
procedures as much as possible within the existing treaty. For example, Article 14 of the Japan-
Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) speaks of establishing a Sub-Committee on 
Improvement of Business Environment. Companies located in Malaysia can voice their concerns 
regarding local regulations to liaison offices of the Sub-Committee. The complaints are then 
passed to the Joint Committee under JMEPA and, if needed, are forwarded to the relevant minis-
try to ensure better functioning of the agreement.
One element that the Japanese companies would like to see included in prospective free 
trade agreements is further liberalization of investment. 42 Apart from agreements with ASEAN 
and Vietnam, all of Japan’ s FTAs include an investment chapter; this mainly entails provisions 
related to investment treatment: national treatment and MFN treatment, as well as performance 
requirements and state vs. investor dispute settlement provisions. Japanese companies in the dis-
cussed sectors have already widely invested in ASEAN countries and would now like to see the 
removal of remaining barriers to investment. Investment liberalization achieved under an FTA or 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) can bring several benefi ts. However, for many, especially de-
veloping countries, investment liberalization is a sensitive area. Given its operations in ASEAN 
countries, the Japanese private sector would welcome the removal of regulatory hurdles to invest-
ment. This means introducing investment liberalization provisions – for example, deregulation 
or removal of limitations on foreign investment – which may mean prohibiting foreign investors 
from engaging in a joint venture. 43
The simplifi cation of procedures and standards is another important part of trade facilita-
tion provisions. In this respect, the reduction of lead time is deemed most crucial from the pri-
vate sector’ s perspective. Lead time is the time from when the decision to start the production is 
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made, to when the fi nal good is completed and reaches its destination. It includes elements such 
as ordering of the product, procuring of parts, assembly, transportation, custom clearance, and/
or safety checks. Lead time can be measured in days depending on the type of product. In tradi-
tional manufacturing networks, Japanese companies had a well-established pyramid structure of 
suppliers. Each big company had a group of permanent subcontractors who sold them parts and 
components purchased from the third level of producers, forming vertical distribution networks. 
As this type of arrangement continued for many years, companies knew what to expect and lead 
time was short. However, this consistency ended when parts of the production networks were 
moved to East Asia. Lead time depends on the RoO and regulations of the country from which 
the parts are procured, and from that where the assembly site is located. Therefore, the MNCs 
started to pay more attention to the issues of supply chains logistics and effi ciency. Procurement 
of parts is an important factor behind the total lead time. Further, lead time is infl uenced by tariffs 
as well as RoOs and regulations between the country that sells and the country that buys a part. 
For example, an interviewed company manufacturing electronic goods has a lead time of about 
88 days in order to produce a certain model for a given market. That means that if it wants to sell 
the product in December, it needs to start to work in October. If during this time the company or 
the customer wants to change or cancel their orders, adjustments cannot be made before the 88 
days. If the goods are no longer required, they need to be stocked, which implies additional costs. 
Reducing lead time makes the production process more fl exible and adaptable.







Transport to the 
Assembly Site Manufacturing
Existing:   88 20 30-60 2 1 5
Desired:   46.5 10 30 0.5 1 5
Source:  Research interview with business representative, MNC in electric and electronic sector, May 2010, 
Tokyo.
In this example, production takes only fi ve out of 88 days. The procurement of parts is the lon-
gest stage. The company has little control over this process as it includes transport and border 
clearance. If a company is procuring parts from different countries, their delivery times usually 
differ. The fi nal lead time depends on the last delivery date. Transportation and custom clearance 
stages cannot be accurately calculated beforehand as it depends greatly on the customs offi cer 
and other external conditions. Traffi c in the port might hold up the vessel for a number of days. 
If the customs offi cer is not sure whether the exported parts require duties, or the description of 
the shipped product is unclear, the border clearance procedure may easily be extended several 
days. 44 The producer might need to provide additional, detailed information. Alternatively, the 
customs offi cer may wish to conduct random openings and checks of the cargo. In such a case, 
the company may provide a bank guarantee to pay duties for one to three months; this means that 
the company authorizes the bank to set aside the amount of money that may be required if the 
product is taxable, and further, it aids in the answering of questions posed by the customs offi cers 
in exchange for the immediate release of held goods. This, however, is not a real solution to the 
problem. Moreover, in case of large investments, setting aside such funds is problematic for the 
company. According to one of Japan’ s top MNCs, from the heavy industry and machinery sec-
tor, in terms of medium technology products (like parts and components, for example), even the 
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naming of the product in the invoice and packing list may change the duration of customs pro-
cedures. 45 If a part is called, for instance, “steam turbine component” it will most likely pass the 
border quicker. On the other hand, if it is called “piping” or “tubing,” the insuffi cient information 
might cause additional inquiry.
Apart from customs clearance, the transportation of parts is another stage of parts procure-
ment, during which process a region-wide FTA could help reduce lead time. Under existing FTAs 
in East Asia, spare parts can be imported duty free if they are shipped on the same vessel as the 
fi nished good. 46 If shipped separately, every part requires a certifi cate of origin. This regulation 
was formed because the business of spare parts is very profi table and importers wish to control 
their trade. Therefore, they lobby the government to introduce appropriate provisions. If spare 
parts are sold by an authorized service parts distributor or service point, the profi t is kept within 
the same company. Unaffi liated parts vendors reduce companies’ profi t. On the other hand, such 
procedures lengthen lead time. Therefore, some big companies oppose this rule. One of the inter-
viewed MNCs claimed that even if parts are sold by an authorized service center, the company 
uses mainly local, small service points, and therefore does not make profit from selling spare 
parts. It would like to be able to make a list of parts registered in advance to export freely, even 
if they are to be sold separately. At the moment, the CTC rule of origin is applied to spare parts. 
The companies would prefer either 40 percent VC or elimination of duties for parts. As those 
external factors are not directly related to the quality of the fi nished good, MNCs would prefer to 
reduce this stage. Others, such as safety checks or testing, cannot be shortened. Companies’ main 
preference, and a possible incentive for a wider and bigger FTA, would be an opportunity to pro-
cure parts more quickly and with no cost. The current FTA network allows companies to lower 
the costs relating to tariffs. Over time, however, FTAs’ ability to reduce lead time has become the 
key interest of many companies.
6. Conclusion
Japanese companies established extensive production networks in East Asia long before the 
country signed its fi rst FTA with Singapore in 2002. They paid MFN import duties, or in some 
cases, enjoyed special investment incentive schemes offered by ASEAN governments. When 
AFTA was signed, companies could trade under reduced tariffs within ASEAN, but imports 
from Japan were still subject to the MFN rate. Bilateral FTAs allowed MNCs located in ASEAN 
to import semi-finished products from Japan, but the finished goods could not move freely 
within AFTA. The ASEAN-Japan FTA allowed for cumulation to be applied between Japan and 
ASEAN. What Japanese companies expect from further trade liberalization in the region is not 
primarily reduction of tariffs, but improvement of business environment, trade facilitation and 
services liberalization. While existing FTAs are important for procuring parts without duties, 
provisions enhancing the business environment would further improve MNCs’ operations in East 
Asia. An ideal solution, although inconceivable in the short term, would be a one-market scenario 
with no duty and no customs clearance. For Japanese companies, whether improvement of the 
business environment will take place under the existing FTAs, a region-wide one with Japan’ s 
participation, under third party FTAs, or under the WTO’ s negotiations, there is little difference.
Trade theory states that the bigger the FTA, the more economic gains it brings. Hence, put-
ting aside political considerations, a wider FTA should bring bigger economic results. In Bilat-
eral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacifi c, Aggarwal writes:
Each of these agreement types derives its advantages and disadvantages from tradeoffs be-
tween political and economic effi ciency. For example, agreements among few states develop 
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easily, but implicitly involve welfare losses due to trade diversion and marginalization of 
weaker countries. Conversely, larger agreements maximize economies of scale by expanding 
markets, promoting broad-based trade liberalization, and enabling global integration, but 
demand more political effort to negotiate. 47
While negotiating a multilateral FTA, even one that does not include deeper liberalization is-
sues, a state has little control over the negotiation process. Negotiating and fi nding a compromise 
among several members is an additional difficulty. The higher the number of members of an 
FTA, and the more diffi cult it is to reach a compromise on confl icting issues, the more political 
effort is required on the side of each negotiating state. Additionally, differences of development 
need to be considered. Taking an example from Japan’ s FTAs, it can easily be seen that the bilat-
eral FTAs offer much deeper liberalization and are a ‘broad band’ type of treaties. The AJCEP, on 
the other hand, includes all members of the Association, but is limited to liberalization of goods 
only. There is a clear difference in terms of the scope of liberalization between the two types of 
agreements. For Japanese companies, it is that difference that causes them to be cautious about 
a region-wide FTA. The Deputy Director of the International Economic Research Division at 
JETRO confi rms that companies would prefer to see an improvement of the existing agreements 
to an establishment of a region-wide one. 48 This preference is due to the expectation that such an 
FTA will be diffi cult to negotiate, and a high number of members may cause it to be the “lowest 
common denominator” FTA. Such agreement would not improve the business environment in the 
region and would not include provisions leading to the reduction of lead time. Therefore, for Jap-
anese companies in the discussed sectors, there is little value added in a region-wide FTA. There 
is also no common preference regarding which of the three coexisting schemes would be the best 
option. Having no particular direct interest in such a treaty, the MNCs are cautious in expressing 
their interest and do not lobby the government to increase efforts in this respect. Instead, there is 
a preference for strengthening the deep liberalization provisions and enhancing the implementa-
tion of the existing agreements. Given the internationalization of Japanese production networks 
and the level of regional interdependence, it is not the size of the agreement that companies are 
concerned about, but the scope and depth of liberalization.
Analyzing the business sector’ s preferences for FTAs can provide useful conclusions re-
garding the benefi ts and options for further regional economic integration. Furthermore, it can 
help determine which regional framework would be a suitable base for a prospective wider trade 
liberalization treaty. This study refl ects on the interest of Japanese companies in different levels 
of FTAs, based on research done within the electronics and machinery industries. Both of those 
sectors are among those with the highest share of value of exports to East Asian states. Still, as 
companies’ interest in trade treaties depends greatly on production and trade patterns, further re-
search is needed within other sectors of the manufacturing industry. For example, the chemical or 
textile industry’ s products are subject to different production processes and rules of origin than 
electronic equipment or vehicles (i.e., two step-rules of origin for textile industry).
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